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In early 1993, many members of Congress were looking to an active
environmental agenda, bolstered by a new administration with a
decidedly pro-environmental stance. By the end of the Congressional
Session, in October 1994, the weight of partisan politics and a densely
packed schedule crushed optimistic and ambitious plans to reform
federal environmental laws.1 The only significant environment bill
reaching the President creates a desert wilderness in California. Risk
assessment proved to be a major, if not the largest, obstacle, and it
contributed to a massive environmental train wreck at the end.
Legislators nevertheless showed unprecedented interest.
The terms "risk assessment" or "risk analysis" appeared in over 30
bills and amendments, of which about a dozen bills applied specifically
to environmental health risks.2 I will discuss the most important and
try to find some meaning in five themes that emerged in the debates.
Since the 103d Congress is now relegated to history, I will avoid
detailed discussion of particular legislation. Yet, there is a strong
likelihood that the 104th Congress will reincarnate most, if not all, of
these measures, especially since the majority and minority parties have
switched places.
* Views expressed here are the author's, and do not necessarily reflect thbse of the
Office of Technology Assessment or the U.S. Congress. The author thanks Mark
Boroush, David Butler and Mike Gough for thoughtful comments, but any mistakes
are his.
** Dr. Paxman is Senior Analyst in the (Congressional) Office of Technology
Assessment. A toxicologist, he received his BA. and MA. (Cellular Physiology and
Pharmacology) from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and his Ph.D.
(Environmental Health Sciences) from Johns Hopkins University.
1 Congressional Environmental and Energy Study Conference, Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources Status Report for the 103d Congress, Oct. 13, 1994.
2 See generally, Congressional Research Service, Comparison of Environmental
Risk Provisions In the 103d Congress (1994) (reprinted in part, Linda Jo Schierow,
Comparison.... 5 Risk 283 (1994). See also, L. J. Schierow, Senator Johnston's
Proposals for Regulatory Reform..., 6 Risk 1 (1995).
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Context of 103d Congress
Congressional interest in risk assessment represented a confluence of
political and scientific factors. Congress, reflecting public sentiment,
became more conservative and antigovernment. The Administration
energized the opposition, and several key studies by nonpartisan, non-
ideological, science policy organizations and a book by a U.S. Supreme
Court nominee fomented interest in risk assessment.
All of the reports represented views of respected experts who
provided recommendations and options for Congress. A Carnegie
Commission released "Risk and the Environment,"3 the Office of
Technology Assessment released "Researching Health Risks" 4 and
the National Research Council released "Issues in Risk Assessment" 5
and "Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment." 6 Also, Judge
Breyer's Supreme Court nomination sparked interest in his book.7
Collectively, these works raised the visibility of risk assessment.
Attention by the media and the scientific community after each release
made risk an unavoidable issue. They increased the perception of the
lay public that fundamental problems exist with how agencies do risk
assessments. They also detailed for Congressional staff and others
interested in risk reform the nature of concerns and recommended
remedies. Thus, risk-based bills became very prescriptive, often taking
language directly from various reports.
Besides directly enhancing Congressional interest, these reports also
brought more scientists and alternative scientific perspectives into the
legislative process. A common finding was the need for more research
and the importance of research in improving risk assessment. Advisory
panels for the reports were a ready source of experts for many hearings
3 Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, Risk and the
Environment (1993).
4 See generally, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Researching
Health Risks (1993).
5 See National Research Council, Issues in RiskAssessment (1993).
6 See National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (in
press).
7 Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
(1993).
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on Capitol Hill. The often well-attended and well-publicized hearings
created a sense of importance that did not escape the attention of most
members of Congress.
Another factor in the prominence of risk issues was the widespread
antigovernment feeling and growing public disenchantment with
Congress. Few would have predicted, at least in public, the consequence
of the sentiment in the 1994 midterm elections. Yet, observers detected
a movement seeking diminished government control. 8 This
conservatism manifested itself as an environmental backlash, where
skeptical and sometimes antagonistic lawmakers aimed barbs at the
environmental movement. 9 Members of Congress questioned the
need for the public and private spending on the environment. Some saw
federal regulations as burdens on local jurisdictions. A prominent
example concerned waterborne radon in Hastings, Nebraska, a town of
23,000, where a plant to remove radon would cost $65M and be the
single largest drain on the town's treasury.10
The environmental community described what emerged as an
"unholy trinity," consisting of "takings" (used by some to describe the
economic losses from governmental regulation), "unfunded mandates"
(federal requirements for state and local expenditures) and risk
assessment (encompassing cost-benefit analyses). Environmental
organizations saw not only a triple threat, but also diminished clout
limiting their effectiveness in negotiations.
Overarching particular issues was Congress' relationship with the
Clinton Administration. Legislative battles often served as opportunities
for partisan one-upmanship rather than debates on merits. Because
some in Congress and the environmental community viewed increased
calls for risk assessment as weakening environmental legislation, it
became in many ways a partisan issue. Some used it to delay legislation
and prevent the President from achieving legislative success.
In committee hearings, Administration officials argued that the
type and extent of policy analysis, such as risk assessment, was an
8 Catalina Camia, Legislators Draw in the Reins on Environmental Rules, Cong.
Q., April 30, 1994, at 1060-1063.
9 Id.
10 Supra note 4, at I62.
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executive, not legislative prerogative. 11 Risk-based legislation, they
argued, was unjustified 12 - particularly in view of an executive order
requiring risk assessments for all major regulations and creation of a
committee to explore comparative risk assessment. 13
Agenda
Distinct philosophical differences framed legislative debates. For
clarity, I classify these into three camps, each with its own agenda.
The most strident and ardent camp consisted of those wanting to
roll-back legislation to ameliorate what they viewed as an excessive
regulatory burden. This group contends that the benefits for some
environmental regulations do not justify their costs. They believe that
many environmental problems arise from "phantom" risks,
1 4
unsubstantiated by science, or the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) excessively conservative assessments that forces them to
regulate minor risks. To ease regulatory burdens, this camp pushed for
increased analysis of costs and benefits prior to regulations being
adopted and for the use of "good science."
A second camp tried to maintain the status quo. Many current laws
forbid or limit consideration of costs in deciding whether to regulate or
the level at which to do so. This camp viewed various risk proposals as
an attempt to weaken and eventually eviscerate environmental laws.
With the Administration, it also argued that risk assessment and cost-
benefit analyses were already being required by executive order.
Members of the final group were somewhere between the first two.
They sought reform by, e.g., proposing ways to improve EPA's risk
assessments, but they aimed to provide EPA with organizational
processes and offices to facilitate interaction with the scientific
community and to improve the use of science. They did not fear their
efforts would "weaken" environmental protection.
11 See generally, Strengthening Risk Assessment within EPA: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Technology, Environment, and Aviation, House Comm. on Science,
Space and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
12 Supra, Katin testimony.
13 E.O. 12866, 58 F.R 51735, Sept. 30, 1993.
14 See, e.g., Huber, supra in this issue of Risk.
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Risk Legislation
The 103d Congress' failure to pass any major environmental
legislation was not for lack of trying. Again, twelve bills had language
serving at least one of two broad objectives. Several required economic
and risk analysis by codifying risk assessment into EPA's rulemaking
process. Others altered the way EPA conducts risk assessments by
setting forth and mandating a process for updating risk assessment
guidelines with increased involvement of the scientific community.
Both called for comparative risk assessment to foster the public
understanding of the magnitudes of risk. I classify such proposals into
the five categories shown in Table 1 and discussed below.
Table 1
Risk Proposals in the 103d Congress
Comprehensive Risk Bills
" HR 4306 Risk Assessment Improvement Act (Klein)
" HR 2910 Risk Communication Act (Moorhead)
" S. 110 Environmental Risk Reduction Act (Moynihan)
" S. () Sound Science in Risk Assessment Act (Lott)
Risk-RelatedAmendments to Environmental Bills
• Johnston Ain't to S. 171 Department of Environmental Protection Act
(Mica/Thurman with analogous bill in House)
• Johnston Ain't to Clean Water Act Reauthorization
(Mica/Thurman with analogous bill in House)
* Johnston Ain't to Safe Drinking Water Act Reauthorization
• Zimmer Ain't to HR 109 Department of Environmental Protection Act
" Zimmer Ain't to HR 1994 Environmental Research, Development, and
Demonstration Act
" Walker Ain't to HR 3870 Environmental Technologies Act
Risk-RelatedAm't to Non-Environmental Bill
" Condit Ain't to HR 3171 USDA Reorganization Act
Risk-Related Provisions in Environmental Legislation
" HR 3800 Superfund reform (HR 3800)
" HR 2448 Radon bill (Waxman)
• HR 872 and S. 331 Pesticide Food Safety Act (Waxman, Kennedy)
" HR 1672 Food Quality Protection Act (Lehman, Bliley, Rowland)
" HR 4916 Environmental Research and Development Demonstration Act
Risk-Related Provisions in Appropriations Bills
• PL 103-327 Depts. of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development,
and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995
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Comprehensive Risk Bills
Comprehensive risk legislation has risk assessment as its organizing
principle. It centered on either the practice and conduct or the use and
application of risk assessment by the EPA.
Risk Assessment ImprovementAct
Representatives Klein, Zimmer and 14 co-sponsors introduced H.R.
4306 in April 1994. It would have established a Risk Assessment
Program within EPA to develop a process for independent peer review
of risk assessments, developing and issuing risk assessment guidelines
designed to incorporate state-of-the-art science, and providing the
opportunity for public input. It would have required the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to establish a
Comparative Risk Assessment pilot program to test risk-ranking
methodology and to develop interagency coordinating mechanisms for
communicating state-of-the-art practices to states. OSTP was to
evaluate risk assessment research and training needs and to prioritize
research according to need and the largest uncertainties in risk
assessment.
The original bill had the support of environmentalists, industry and
the Administration. 15 However, Rep. Walker added amendments that
would have required the judicial review of contested risk assessments
and that "objective" and "unbiased" science were to be used by EPA in
its risk assessments. Walker's stated objective was to indicate that the
guidelines were to be considered "binding rules" and not general
statements of policy; risk assessments, therefore, were to be
"conducted, applied and practiced throughout the agency in
accordance with the guidelines." 16 Courts could then look at
contested risk assessments for departure from the guidelines.
Brown claimed the amendments destroyed the coalition supporting
the bill and altered its intent, 17 and EPA Administrator Browner
withdrew support in July 1994.18
15 Inside EPA, Risk Policy Report, Oct. 14, at 17-20.
16 See generally, H.R Rep. No. 857, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (HR 4306, The Risk
Assessment Improvement Act of 1994).
17 Id.
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- Risk Communication Act
Introduced by Rep. Moorehead in February 1994, the RCA
contained principles for risk assessment and characterization. It sought
to ensure that risk assessments are as scientifically objective and
inclusive of all relevant data as possible. It would have required EPA's
risk assessments to distinguish scientific findings from other
considerations; to consider and discuss all available data; to describe the
selection of any significant assumption, inference or model, to explain
the basis for the choice and to identify any policy or value judgments.
EPA also would have had to characterize populations or resources at
risk and provide the best estimate and the range of uncertainty; provide
meaningful comparisons to other risks; set out a process for reviewing
assessments in view of new information; and ensure public participation
in formulating risk assessment and characterization guidelines.
- Risk Reduction Act
Senator Moynihan introduced this bill to require EPA to set risk-
based priorities. It would have established two committees within the
EPA: one to rank risks to human health and the environment; another
to determine the benefits of eliminating such risks. Its stated objective
for forming these committees was to make science, not politics, the
basis for selecting health and environmental priorities. The bill would
have required the EPA to create risk assessment guidelines that would
set minimum standards for different risk assessment approaches.
-Sound Science in Risk AssessmentAct
Senator Lott would have required EPA to develop uniform general
procedures governing risk assessments and incorporate relevant
guidelines. His bill would have required assessments to be "consistent,"
of "high technical quality," "scientifically sound" and "unbiased."
Moreover, EPA must "disclose all significant uncertainties regarding
facts, scientific knowledge, the validity of analytical techniques, or
numerical risk estimates" in terms "readily understandable" to the
public. In a cover letter, the Senator urged his colleagues to support it
because "(r)isk assessments must be accountable to the public and
Congress; not just subject to the discretion of invisible bureaucrats."
18 Id.
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Risk-RelatedAmendments to Environmental Bills
Amendments to several major pieces of environmental legislation
engendered vigorous policy disagreements over whether environmental
laws should contain mandates for EPA to balance costs and benefits of
regulation as well as the requisite level of analysis. The heaviest debate
centered on risk proposals by Senator Johnston and Representative
Walker. While six separate bills contained amendments, in most cases
they were slight variations of Johnston's original amendment.
-Johnston amendments to
EPA elevation to cabinet-level status legislation
To S. 171, Senator Johnston attached an amendment requiring each
final rule to contain what became known as "Johnston-type" analysis.
The amendments would have required regulations to contain an
estimate of human or ecological health addressed by the rule and the
rule's anticipated impact on the target risk; a comparative analysis of
the risk addressed by the rule compared to other risks to which the
public is exposed; and an estimate of the costs associated with
implementation of and compliance with the rule.
Industry lauded Johnston's amendment, 19 since it required EPA
to estimate risk and conduct comparative risk and cost-benefit analyses
for every regulation. EPA also would have to certify that a proposed
regulation would significantly advance public protection. The original
bill failed to leave committee, partly because of the risk language.
-Johnston amendments to
Safe Drinking Water Act Reauthorization
Amendments to SDWA reauthorization carried Johnston-type
analyses but were only to apply to major regulations (exceeding
$I OOM), and would have required only that benefits justify, rather than
exceed, cost (as required in the original). This bill came close to passing.
*Johnston-type amendment to Clean WaterAct
A bipartisan group in committee drafted an alternative to the
reauthorization of the CWA, but their version contained risk assessment
provisions. For all CWA regulations, EPA would have been required to
19 Supra note 15.
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perform risk assessments. A significant departure from the original
Johnston amendment was a requirement that contested risk assessments
undergo judicial review. The amendment kept this bill in committee.
*Zimmer amendment to the EPA cabinet bill
Representative Zimmer amended the EPA cabinet bill to create an
Office of Environmental Risk (OER). It was to provide an
organizational structure within EPA where the director would develop
and implement a strategy for risk reduction. The amendment also
created an Advisory Committee on Relative Risks to advise the
director. Like the Moynihan bill (S. 110), EPA would set its priorities
based on relative risk ranking.
• Walker amendment to the Environmental Technologies Act
The Environmental Technologies Act directs the OSTP to set
federal environmental research and development priorities by using
scientifically-objective information, data, and assessments of risk. The
Walker amendment established guidelines on the necessary elements
for a sound risk assessment and the methods for communicating those
assessments. It added fifteen criteria for conducting risk assessments
and language on risk comparisons and substitution risk, judicial review,
and public notice and comment. The House approved the amendment,
assuring that other environmental legislation, particularly the CWA
reauthorization and Superfund reform, would not be reauthorized
without comparable risk assessment provisions. 20
Risk-Related Amendment to Non-Environmental Bills
The Condit Amendment to USDA reorganization was the only
major non-environmental bill containing risk language. It established an
Office of Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis (ORA&C-BA) to
perform cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment on all major
regulations coming out of USDA. President Clinton signed the bill.
Risk-Related Provisions in Environmental Legislation
While not focusing specifically on risk assessment, some
environmental legislation contained risk-related provisions dealing with
either specific health risks, such as radon, or a type of risk, such as
hazards at Superfund sites.
20 Supra note 1.
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Sup e rfnd reform
Provisions in this bill required that, for any hazard at a Superfund
site, the EPA would include central estimates of risk, as well as upper
and lower bound estimates.
• Radon Awareness and Disclosure Act
Representative Waxman introduced this bill calling for EPA's
assessments of radon dangers to include estimates of population risk
and the reasonable range of uncertainty about such estimates. It passed
the House, but its companion (S. 657) stalled in the Senate.
• Pesticide Food Safety and Food Quality Protection Acts
Representative Waxman and Senator Kennedy introduced into
their respective chambers the Pesticide Food Safety Act. Each
established a single "bright line" standard of one cancer in a million for
pesticide residues in raw and processed foods, if the pesticide is found
to cause cancer in animals or humans.
Representatives Lehman, Bliley and Rowland introduced
competing legislation. In contrast, the Food Quality Protection Act
would have established a single negligible risk standard for pesticide
residues in both raw and processed foods. In setting a standard, EPA
would have had to consider the validity, completeness, and reliability of
available studies; the nature of toxic effects; the dietary exposure; and
the effects on major subgroups of consumers. Dietary risk levels must
consider the percentage of food actually treated, and actual residue
levels. Obviously, this would have required EPA to consider more
information to offset health considerations before setting a standard.
Either bill would have overturned the Delaney Clause that governs
pesticide tolerances: It bars the EPA from granting tolerances for
pesticide residues found to induce cancer in animals that concentrates
in processed foods. 2 1 This prohibition made the Clause an important
symbol of environmental protection and food safety to environmental
and other public interest groups but also a symbol of excessive zeal to
agricultural and chemical industries.2 2 Either bright line or negligible
21 National Research Council, Regulating Pesticides in Food- The Delaney Paradox
(1987).
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risk standards would allow EPA to consider other information, even if
an animal assay of a pesticide demonstrated carcinogenicity.
- Environmental Research and Development Demonstration Act
ERDDA required that EPA identify personnel needs for research,
its Science Advisory Board (SAB) review EPA research activities and
that EPA submit Congressional reports to identify, prioritize and
describe major research areas that would reduce risk assessment
uncertainties. The bill also established a separately-identified risk
assessment research program and sought to improve methods for
assessing economic impacts.
Risk-Related Provisions in Appropriations Bills
Among the most significant, but least noted, proposals appeared in
Conference Reports concerning EPA appropriations. 2 3
Conference report on EPA appropriations
Both Senate and House reports contained language that sought to
improve the quality of supported research. The conferees agreed on the
importance of "credible" science and the need for EPA to improve
peer-review. They required EPA to work with the National Science
Foundation (NSF), the National Research Council, and the Carnegie
Commission in the merit review process. The Senate report required
that half of EPA's extramural research be subject to the NSF peer-
review process. It also required EPA to report to Congress on research
to be conducted, addressing not only its nature but also how it would
affect EPA's priorities. Thie Act was signed in September 1994.
Risk Themes
Other than the Condit Amendment to the USDA Reorganization
Act and the appropriations measures, no bill, amendment, or provision
containing risk language reached the President. In fact, many claim that
opposition to risk proposals largely contributed to failure of the 103d
Congress to pass environmental legislation.24
22 Christopher J. Bosso, Pesticides and Politics (1987).
23 See generally, S. Rep. No. 311, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Appropriations for
Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies).
24 Supra notes 1 and 15.
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Several analysts have assessed the major issues legislators were trying
to address. For the House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, Schierow provided a side-by-side comparison of provisions
related to environmental risk analysis. 25 Agency and Congressional
sources also analyzed risk bills.2 6 From these sources and the
legislation, I discerned five major themes that kept reappearing,
including good science, cost-benefit analysis, transparency and
accountability, risk comparisons, and administrative prominence.
These themes seem to be based on several common perceptions
relating to whether environmental laws are primarily protect human and
environmental heath or as create unwarranted economic burdens. Most
recent proposals seem to be driven by the second view.
Perceptions That Drive Many Proposals
One perception is that the agency uses conservative assumptions
biased towards stringent regulation. Moreover, EPA scientists and risk
assessors are seen as "invisible bureaucrats," out of touch with the
scientific community. Those who believe this feel that, if they open up
the process, risk assessments would not withstand peer review and we
would be rid of excessively costly regulations of marginal benefit.
Compared to other risks in public life, the thesis goes, environmental
risks are not great, and if the public understood this, they would not
support regulation. Finally, some see EPA's lawyers as controlling
decision making, minimizing and even ignoring scientists' input.
Good Science
Thus, a key theme appearing throughout recent proposals is that
"good science" needs to be used. In this context, "good," means the
latest risk-assessment methodologies and knowledge of the effects of
specific chemicals. Even more, "good science" implies replacing policy-
based default assumptions with actual health data. Finally, it requires
using all available data, not selectively excluding data that does not
support regulation. The stated goals of the'RCA and the RAIA were to
mandate the use of "good" science in risk assessments.
25 Supra note 2.
26 Supra notes 1 and 15.
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Bills focused on several aspects of risk assessment to promote good
science. Common proposals included mandates for peer-reviewed risk
assessment guidelines that EPA would periodically update. The RAIA
required regular development and publication of EPA risk assessment
guidelines; similarly, the USDA Reorganization Act requires the USDA
to develop a strategy for consistent risk/benefit analysis using state of
the art scientific methods. Superfund reform bills required a national
risk protocol with guidelines for assessments related to Superfund sites.
The RAIA required EPA to provide independent peer-review of its
risk assessment guidelines and mechanisms for the Director of the Risk
Assessment Program, established in the bill, to consult with assessment
experts. Similarly, the amendment to the EPA elevation bill required it
to publish and use peer-reviewed guidelines. The RAIA also required
EPA to review all of their risk characterizations annually to determine
compliance with guidelines and report to Congress. Also, several bills
required EPA to develop a process for reviewing prior assessments.
Repeatedly, language required EPA to provide Congress with
reports on research and training needs. The RAIA required the director
of a Risk Assessment Program it created to evaluate and report them.
Similarly, ERDDA required EPA to identify research personnel needs,
and its SAB to review research activities. Both the RAIA and ERDDA
required EPA to submit Congressional reports that identify, prioritize,
and describe major research areas to reduce risk assessment
uncertainties. The ETA required specific procedures to develop research
priorities for environmental technologies.
To achieve state-of-the-art science, several provisions facilitated peer
review and communication with the scientific community. This is
probably best demonstrated in the Appropriations conference
reports. 27 Conferees required EPA to subject extramural research to a
peer-review system guided by the NSF and other science organizations.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
A major feature of most risk proposals is that EPA characterize and
quantify regulated risks as well as the benefits and costs of regulation.
Yet, two major differences appeared. The original Johnston
amendments required cost-benefit analysis of all rules, while the
27 See generally, H.R Rep. No. 715, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Appropriations for
Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies).
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SDWA proposals required EPA to only assess the benefits of rules
having a likely effect exceeding $100M. Another is that in the original,
the benefits must "exceed" costs, while the SDWA required the rules to
only "justify" costs.
Requiring such an analysis in any environmental bill engendered
particularly sharp debate. Rep. Waxman claimed that the original
Johnston amendment would contradict several environmental statutes,
such as the SDWA, that explicitly forbid cost-benefit analysis.2 8 This
proved especially troublesome since his subcommittee had jurisdiction
over many major environmental statutes.
Other provisions mandated EPA to characterize and quantify
regulated risks, including estimates of existing risks and their
"significance." By comparing those to estimated risks under proposed
exposure levels, the agency could calculate benefits in terms of "lives
saved" or "health effects averted." The RRA creates a Committee
within EPA to determine such benefits for each rule. Some bills also
required agencies to characterize and quantify costs, e.g., the USDA
and SDWA reorganization.
A clear objective of some legislation, e.g., the EPA elevation and
SDWA reauthorization bills, was that EPA identify reasonable
opportunities to achieve significant risk reduction, i.e., to reduce the
greatest risks and avoid regulating "minimal" ones.
There also appeared a willingness to promote research into
developing new methods for estimating costs and benefits. ERDDA
contained language to establish a separately identified risk assessment
research program and to improve methods to assess economic impacts.
SDWA reauthorization required EPA to establish methods for
determining costs and benefits of environmental regulations.
Transparency andAccountability
Because some perceive risk assessments as excessively conservative,
certain provisions called for EPA's processes to incorporate "more
public input" and be "more open." Critics derided the agency for its
use of conservative default assumptions, which, they argue, accumulate
and exaggerate the actual risk to health and the environment. 2 9 For
28 Supra notes 1 and 15.
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each risk assessment, EPA must identify and describe the use of any
assumption. Since default options often involve policy, not science,
choices, language also calls for distinguishing science from policy.
Most risk provisions required EPA to develop and publish risk
assessment guidelines, designed to make risk assessments "transparent"
to the public. The RAIA required EPA to disclose the degree of
conservatism, as determined by the default assumptions used in
assessment. Further, the agency had to explain its choice of
assumptions, inferences and models and provide a representative list of
alternatives. Similarly, the Superfund reform bill calls for EPA to
develop a national risk protocol that makes the models used and the
selection criteria for the models transparent. The language indicated
that its authors wanted these guidelines to be "binding."3 0
The RAIA required EPA to release a public notice of its intent to
publish and to report to Congress on the status of risk assessment
guidelines. SDWA required EPA to report to Congress on risk
management decisions that present an inherent and unavoidable choice
between competing risks.
Certain provisions also would mandate that contested risk
assessments undergo judicial review. By requiring compliance with
guidelines, those provisions were intended to increase agency
accountability. 3 1 In contrast, EPA Administrator Browner claimed
that this provision would make guidelines and risk assessments
"unreasonably vulnerable to judicial challenges." 32
Risk Comparison
Relating or comparing disparate risks became a major theme in the
103d Congress. The objective was to use risk assessments to compare
one risk, or set of risks, against another to set regulatory priorities and
to put risk estimates in a magnitude context - as well as to promote
research.
29 Supra notes 5, 6 and 7.
30 Supra note 16.
31 Supra note 16.
32 Id.
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For several years, analysts have considered setting EPA's regulatory
priorities based on relative risks. Relative to other risks that most
individuals confront, some analysts believe that many regulated
environmental risks are small. 33 They have elaborate mechanisms for
comparing fatalities from one activity or substance to those for another.
EPA's SAB released two reports that examined risk-based decision
making within the agency.34 More recently, EPA commissioned a
conference on the topic and published its proceedings. 3 5 Congress also
looked into EPA priority-setting. The RRA established two committees
within EPA to rank risks to human health and environment. The
Zimmer amendment to the EPA elevation bill created a committee on
relative risk to advise EPA on its strategic direction. The SDWA
reauthorization required EPA to identify and rank sources of pollution
with respect to the relative degree of risk of adverse effects on human
health, the environment, and public welfare.
Others argue that risk comparisons furnish a poor foundation for
risk communication, decision making or priority setting - claiming
that quantifiable consequences alone are only one of the legitimate
lenses through which to view threats, safety, and the environment. They
also argue that those involved in risk ranking must not only consider
risk magnitude but also other dimensions, e.g., fear of risk.
36
Nevertheless, relative risk appears in the Walker and Johnston
amendments, and the Risk Communication Act, all mandating
comparisons of EPA-regulated risks with those familiar to ordinary
citizens and ostensibly putting them into a meaningful perspective.
In furtherance of these objectives, the EPA appropriations bill for
example, requires EPA to report to Congress on research it will conduct
on comparative risk assessment.
33 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 7.
34 See generally, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Science Advisory Board,
Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems (1987)
and Reducing Risk. Setting Priorities and Strategies for Environmental Protection
(1990).
35 Adam M. Finkel & Dominic Golding, Worst Things First? The Debate over
Risk-Based National Environmental Priorities (1994).
36 Id.
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Administrative Prominence
To minimize the role of value judgments and foster science-based
decision making, several bills elevate those conducting risk assessments
to prominent positions. The RAIA established a Risk Assessment
Program at EPA, and the Zimmer amendment to the elevation bill
established the OER and an advisory committee on relative risk.
Similarly, the USDA Reorganization Act established the ORA&C-BA.
Not only were these offices to conduct risk assessments, but also to
make expertise accessible to administrators. The language of the RAIA
required the program director to advise the EPA administrator; and the
Zimmer amendment required the director of the OER to advise EPA
offices. Similarly, the director of ORA&C-BA will advise USDA
offices and agencies about risk-related issues.
Some provisions even elevated risk assessment to the Executive
Office of the President (EOP). An RAIA provision promoted
interagency coordination by requiring OSTP to survey risk assessment
practices and advise the President and Congress. The survey would
examine and continuously monitor methods and uses of risk assessment
within agencies.
Expectations for the 104th Congress
The last Congress set the stage for risk legislation. Even without
changes in membership, risk figured to be the issue on which the success
of most, if not all, environmental legislation would depend. Republican
control should, however, enhance political momentum and accelerate
the introduction of risk proposals. Democratic leadership brought risk
proposals up for committee debate, fearing they would weaken
environmental legislation with analytic requirements and opportunities
for time-consuming legal challenges. However, a Republican-controlled
Congress, with fewer reasons, if any, for reluctance, faces few obstacles
that prevented bills from being brought to floor votes in the 103d
Congress.
"Risk assessment" and "comparative risk" became political
buzzwords. Congressman Brown complained that most legislators and
staff did not fully understand the science or the implications of
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pending legislation. 37 Certainly, some risk language was highly
prescriptive and very technical. This and the level of Congressional
interest provides a window of opportunity for professional societies and
trade organizations that might see value in mobilizing their members to
help educate the current Congress.
By controlling committee agendas, chairs will likely facilitate
debate on risk analysis. A sign of their desire appears in a seldom
discussed codicil of the Republican "Contract with America," used
during the midterm election and the transition to the 104th Congress.
It describes bills that would, if that party prevailed, be introduced
within the first 100 days of the session. Under the "Job Creation and
Wage Enhancement Act," risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis are
part of a bill to "create jobs and raise worker wages." Given this time
pressure, one should expect Congress to introduce some of the
proposals discussed here, either unchanged or as parts of new
legislation. Also, the attention devoted to such issues in the last
Congress ensures they will be central in future environmental debates.
37 Supra note 16.
